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Abstract—Ring oscillators (ROs) are a robust way to imple-
ment a physical unclonable function (PUF) into ASICs or FPGAs,
but claims of predictability arose recently. We describe why
this likely results from not using adjacent ROs for pairwise
comparison because of spatial patterns in mean frequency and
correlation coefficients found by principal component analysis.
We show that the covariance is too small for our approach to
estimate bits if adjacent ROs are compared. Our assumption of
normality for the inter-device distribution passes an Anderson-
Darling test and we outline that devices with proximate serial
numbers are not more similar than other devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
A physical unclonable function (PUF) utilises unavoidable
manufacturing tolerances to derive a secret key unique to the
device for secure identification, encryption, etc. The use of
Ring Oscillators (ROs) as PUFs is based on the assumption
that these tolerances will impair the frequency of individual
ROs in an independent and random manner so that the exact
frequencies are unpredictable. To derive a binary key from a
set of ROs, it is preferable to use a differential evaluation,
e.g. a pairwise comparison as in [1], because the frequencies
are also susceptible to environmental changes. According to
experimental data from an ASIC implementation [1], RO-
PUFs using this are almost ideally unique and by far the most
reliable PUFs when using intra and inter Hamming distance
[1] as measure for reliability and uniqueness, respectively. In
[2], using the same experimental dataset, the results regarding
Hamming distance are verified, but the PUF output is said
to be compressible by context tree weighting to 77% of
their original size, indicating significant redundancy and a
lack of entropy. This would open up a way to estimate bits
from other ones, thus introducing a vulnerability. Although
[1] and [2] use the same dataset, a substantial difference
becomes evident on a closer look: While in [1] adjacent ROs
have been compared, in [2] explicitly non-adjacent ROs have
been compared. Our contribution. We apply a selection of
statistical methods on the data published by Maiti et al. in
[3], who recorded 100 samples of the frequencies of 512
ROs each implemented on 193 Xilinx Spartan (XC3S500E)
FPGAs at room temperature. The resulting statistical figures
aid in the understanding of correlation processes important
for the security of PUF realisations. Outline. Section III
analyses the inter-device distribution of the RO frequencies,
followed by Section IV investigating similarity of devices and
Section V calculating entropy estimates. In Section VI an
approach to estimate bits via covariance matrices is taken and
in Section VII we apply a principal component analysis (PCA)
to inspect correlations in detail before we finally conclude in
Section VIII.
II. NOMENCLATURE
To reduce the influence of noise and environmental changes
on our statistical analysis, we calculate the mean of the 100
readings from each individual RO provided in [3] and arrange
them in a matrix F whose elements are referred to as
Fi,j i ∈ {0, . . . , 511} j ∈ {0, . . . , 192} (1)
where row number i is the index of the RO and column number
j is the index of the FPGA. To analyse dependencies of ROs
within a device, we use the deviation of an RO’s frequency
from the mean frequency of the device it resides on as
Di,j = Fi,j − 511mean
m=0
(Fm,j) (2)
which form matrix D of the same size as F . meanom=n(zm)
denotes the arithmetic mean of {zn, . . . , zo} herein. To derive
a matrix of output bits R, we first group adjacent ROs
disjunctively to ring oscillator pairs (ROPs) and calculate their
frequency differences
Bk,j = F2k+1,j − F2k,j k ∈ {0, . . . , 255} (3)
composing matrix B. The elements of R then are defined as
Rk,j =
{
1 Bk,j > 0
0 Bk,j ≤ 0
(4)
III. DETERMINATION OF DISTRIBUTION
An important characteristic in a statistical investigation and
imperative for Sections IV, V, VI and VII is the identification
of the probability distribution, here among the devices. I.e.
we test 512 respectively 256 random variables each with
193 samples. Dependencies are not yet considered. Due to
the nature of the manufacturing tolerances and because they
apply similarly to all ROs, we assume a normal distribution
for their frequencies, which implies the same for deviations
and differences. To verify this assumption, we performed an
Anderson-Darling test [4] for normality on the frequency and978-1-4799-4833-8/14/$31.00 c©2014 IEEE
Table I
RESULTS OF THE ANDERSON-DARLING TEST FOR NORMALITY
quantiles of A∗2
data tested 50% 90% 99% max A∗2
frequencies 0.3990 0.5040 0.5996 0.6753
deviations 0.3572 0.6403 1.0384 1.3465
differences 0.3534 0.6595 0.9078 0.9973
on the deviation of each RO and on the frequency difference
of each ROP using
A2 = −
N−1∑
n=0
(
2n+ 1
N
( ln(Φ(Yn))
+ ln(1− Φ(YN−1−n)) ) + 1)
(5)
where Φ(·) is the normal cumulative distribution function [5],
Y the scaled (divided by standard deviation), centered (mean
subtracted) and sorted in ascending order sample vector, and
N the number of samples. Yn is the n
th element of Y .
Using the sample size correction
A∗2 = A2
(
1 + 4N−1 + 25N−2
)
(6)
to fit the results to the tabulated limits in [6], normality has
then to be rejected with 1% significance level if A∗2 is greater
than 1.047. From Table I, showing selected quantiles of the
results for frequencies, deviations and differences, can be read
that the majority of all three is well below the critical value.
Less than one percent of the ROs exceed it with their deviation
which can be counted as outliers. It is therefore justified to
assume a normal distribution of the frequencies of each RO(P)
among the devices – i.e. within the rows of F , D and B.
IV. SIMILARITY ANALYSIS
Important for the security of a PUF is whether the random
process is white. Which means here, that devices close regard-
ing date of production (cf. upper part of Figure 1) should not
be more similar than devices who are distant. To verify this,
the mean empirical variance within groups of devices ranging
from index j = a to b (inclusive) has been calculated by
s2a,b =
511
mean
i=0
(
b
var
j=a
(Di,j)
)
(7)
and plotted in Figure 1 for groups of at least five devices. If
the process would be non-white, the darker areas, i.e. smaller
variance within the group, should coincide with the area where
the plot of serial numbers of the FPGAs is flat. This does not
seem to be the case. More formal, correlating s2a,b with the
difference between the serial numbers of FPGA a and b yields
an absolute value of at most 0.21 for groups of ten devices,
quickly decreasing for smaller or larger groups. It is therefore
generally not advantageous for an adversary to possess devices
with serial numbers close to the one of the target device.
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Figure 1. Dissimilarity in groups of FPGAs together with the serial numbers
of the FPGAs in the group
V. ENTROPY ESTIMATIONS
An upper bound for the entropy of the PUF – still assuming
the bits to be independent – can be derived from the sum of
the bitwise entropies, which depend on the probability of each
bit to be one (or zero). This probability can either be derived
from the bits itself
pk = Pr(Rk,j = 1) =
192
mean
j=0
(Rk,j) (8)
or by modelling the random process and utilising the more
detailed data available. As mentioned in the previous section,
the differences can be assumed normally distributed, yielding
pk = Pr(Rk,j = 1) =
1
2
(
1− erf
(
mean192j=0(Bk,j)√
2 std192j=0(Bk,j)
))
(9)
where erf() is the Error-Function [5].
Figure 2 shows a histogram of the bias in probability
p̂k = pk − 0.5 (10)
with pk according to (8) and (9). The entropy of the PUF
output then follows by
H = −
255∑
k=0
(pk log2(pk) + (1− pk) log2(1− pk)) (11)
which gives 241.0 bits for the binary estimation and 241.3
bits for the normally distributed estimation, so about 94% of
the entropy achievable in 256 bits. However, the practically
usable entropy on a chip will be smaller, because some bits
usually have to be masked due to reliability requirements. Such
masking is not done herein as the intra-instance distribution
relevant for reliability is out of the scope of this paper.
An explanation for the bias can be derived from Figure 3,
in which the elements of D are visualised as dots. While the
variance seems to be similar for all ROs, the mean differs
noticeable even between adjacent ROs. Hence the amount of
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Figure 2. Predictability of bits due to bias, binwidth 0.1
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Figure 3. Regular patterns in frequency deviations Di,j
bias is merely defined by the difference of means and not also
by differing variances.
As a consequence of these bias, not all keys are equally
probable. This opens up a way to get above linear proportion
between the chance of finding the right key and the area of key-
space searched. One just needs to try the keys in descending
order of probability.
Another method to calculate an upper bound for entropy
considering dependencies between instances is to compress
the PUF outputs from various devices. Using the reference
implementation of context tree weighting (CTW) [7] available
from [8] with default options and a binary file containing
all elements of R in column order, the highest compression
rate achieved was 7.86237 bits per byte, i.e. the size of the
compressed data is still 98% of their original size. That this
upper bound is worse than the priorly calculated suggests, that
the compression algorithm was neither able to find inter-bit or
inter-chip dependencies nor to fully utilise the lack of bitwise
entropy. Note that still both bounds rather support the claim
of unpredictability in [1] than that of predictability in [2].
The statement of minimal dependencies between the output
bits is further supported by the comparably small (Pearson)
correlation coefficients within B, of which a representative
selection is plotted in Figure 4. But this does not hold for the
correlation coefficients of the deviations in D, a corresponding
selection also plotted in Figure 4. Their overall slope and the
32 smaller slopes indicate a dependency on the distance of the
ROs. This explains why the correlations vanish for B, because
the pairwise comparison acts as a spatial high-pass filter.
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Figure 4. Correlation with reference to RO(P) of highest index. Obviously
distance depending for deviations D but randomized for differences B
VI. COVARIANCE FITTING APPROACH
Although the correlations in B are small, they might still
pose a threat by allowing to estimate the remaining bits after
having guessed or otherwise become aware of some initial bits.
Our approach is based on the law of large numbers, which
means as soon as the covariance matrix is calculated from a
sufficiently large number of devices, an expanded covariance
matrix including another device should differ only minimal.
If C is the original covariance matrix obtained from training
by N ≫ 1 devices with elements
Ck,l =
N−1
mean
m=0
((
Bk,m− N−1mean
n=0
(Bk,n)
)(
Bl,m− N−1mean
n=0
(Bl,n)
))
(12)
then Ĉ is the expanded covariance matrix of N + 1 devices
with elements
Ĉk,l =
N
mean
m=0
((
Bk,m− N−1mean
n=0
(Bk,n)
)(
Bl,m− N−1mean
n=0
(Bl,n)
))
(13)
where the change in row mean values is assumed negligible to
ease calculating the difference of both matrices. The Euclidean
norm of this difference will be the objective function to a non-
linear least-squares minimisation algorithm
min
BN
‖Ĉ − C‖22 (14)
The Nth column of B BN , corresponding to the estimated
device, partially contains fixed values from guess or meas-
urement. The rest of the vector are free fitting variables to
be adjusted by the minimisation algorithm to minimise the
objective function.
This approach has been evaluated sequentially for eight FP-
GAs randomly chosen from the dataset and different amounts
of fixed frequency differences. The column of B corres-
ponding to the FPGA to be estimated was removed and C
calculated from the remaining 192 FPGAs. As an attacker may
not be able to measure any frequency difference but only to
guess, the fixed values are set first to only their trend using
±1 and afterwards to their exact values. Starting point for the
free variables was the respective mean.
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Figure 5. Performance of minimisation approach via change in correctly
estimated bits for eight randomly chosen FPGAs
The vertical scale of Figure 5 depicts the ability to estimate
bits using the covariance fitting approach to be quite limited,
it is even possible to get less correct bits than at starting point.
VII. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS
To take a closer look on the correlations in Figure 4, we use
PCA, a statistical method to split correlated random variables
into uncorrelated variables and vectors of correlation. It can
be efficiently calculated as a singular value decomposition
(SVD), if the data is arranged in a matrix with each variable
in a column, each observation in a row as well as scaled
and centered such that the columns are zero-mean and unity-
variance.
Y contains the scaled data of FT and its SVD is
Y = U DV T (15)
• Columns of V are the orthonormal principal components,
also called loadings, showing conjointly behaving variables
• Rows of (U D) are the estimations of the principal compon-
ents (PCs) for each observation, i.e. device
• Non-zero elements of diagonal matrixD are the square roots
of the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of Y , which are
proportional to the amount of variance described by the PC
The first eight PCs, sorted left to right in descending order
of described variance, are plotted in Figure 6 so as to reflect the
location of the ROs on the devices. Additionally, histograms
of the respective estimations give an idea of how this PC
is distributed among the devices. The by far largest portion
(about 99%) of variance relates to the mean frequency of a
device (Note: centering removes the mean among ROs with
equal index), and is thus irrelevant as long as ROs from
the same device are compared to derive an output bit. The
second and third largest portion of variance originate from
linear frequency shifts along the y- and x-axis, respectively,
of the device. The following five PCs still show some kind
of geometric pattern, though increasingly randomised. Only
the ninth and higher PCs look fully randomised and their
histograms become increasingly narrow. They are likely to
contain the desired localised random effects responsible for
the uniqueness of the PUF.
The spatial dependency through the first few PCs has major
implications on the security of the PUF output. If the ROs
compared to derive an output bit are located far away from
each other, especially the second and third PC will cause them
to be similarly biased on a device even if there mean frequency
among all devices (cf. Figure 3) is equal. Although R is in
this paper derived from directly adjacent (along the x-axis)
ROs, the number of ones in the key of a device is found to
still correlate by 0.5 with the estimation of the third PC for
the device. This is presumably caused by the ROPs with small
difference in mean, which either tend to zero or one depending
on the sign of the third PC. If spatial dependencies also
apply to ASIC implementations, it explains why the entropy
calculated in [1] using pairwise comparison of adjacent ROs is
significantly larger than the one calculated in [2] by comparing
distant ROs, while both use the same raw data.
Because PCs describe descending amounts of variance, i.e.
contain descending amount of information, they are well suited
for dimension reduction and lossy compression. In this case
it is possible to correctly calculate 85% of all bits using only
the first 102 PCs. This reduction in dimensions, though, is
assumed to not ease e.g. a brute-force attack, as the resulting
dimensions are no longer binary, but real numbers. Based
on the estimations, we assume that even when limiting and
quantising them, it will not result in a smaller amount of keys
to try.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work we justified the assumption of normality
for the inter-device distribution of RO frequencies by an
Anderson-Darling test and showed that the process is white.
Our entropy estimations argue that although single bits can be
heavily biased, the overall entropy of RO-PUFs is satisfactory.
Remaining correlations despite comparing adjacent ROs could
not be exploited by covariance fitting, but future work may
by utilising more advanced algorithms. The depicted level of
unpredictability is found to critically depend on the proximity
of ROs used for pairwise comparison, as there may exist
significant spatial patterns both in mean and in correlation of
frequencies. Further reducing the potential of these patterns to
impair the uniqueness of RO-PUFs is part of future work, too.
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